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Abstract—In this paper we address a sum secrecy rate maxi-
mization problem for a multi-carrier and MIMO communication
system. We consider the case that the receiver is capable of full-
duplex (FD) operation and simultaneously sends jamming signal
to a potential eavesdropper. In particular, we simultaneously take
advantage of the spatial and frequency diversity in the system
in order to obtain a higher level of security in the physical
layer. Due to the non-convex nature of the resulting mathematical
problem, we propose an iterative solution with a guaranteed
convergence, based on block coordinate descent method, by
re-structuring our problem as a separately convex program.
Moreover, for the special case that the transmitter is equipped
with a single antenna, an optimal transmit power allocation
strategy is obtained analytically, assuming a known jamming
strategy. We also study a FD bidirectional secure communication
system, where the jamming power can be reused to enhance the
sum secrecy rate. The performance of the proposed design is then
numerically evaluated compared to the other design strategies,
and under different system assumptions.
Keywords—Full-duplex, wiretap channel, secrecy rate, jamming,
multi-carrier, MIMO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Full-Duplex transceivers are known for their capability to
enhance various aspects of wireless communication systems,
e.g., achieving higher spectral efficiency and physical layer
security, due to the simultaneous transmission and reception
capability on the same channel [2]. Nevertheless, such systems
suffer from the inherent self-interference (SI) from their own
transmitter. Recently, specialized cancellation techniques, e.g.,
[3]–[5], have demonstrated an adequate level of isolation
between Tx and Rx directions to facilitate a FD communication
and motivated a wide range of related studies, see, e.g., [6].
As an interesting use case of such capability, it is known that a
FD receiver can significantly enhance the security of a wireless
system in physical layer, by simultaneously transmitting a
jamming signal to a potential eavesdropper, while receiving
the useful information from the legitimate transmitter. Note
that the information security of the current communication
systems are typically addressed by distributing secret keys,
using cryptographic approaches. This approach mainly relies
on the assumption that a potential eavesdropper has a limited
computational power and hence may not break the exchanged
secret key. On the other hand, this assumption is increasingly
undermined due the advances in the production of digital pro-
cessors, and leads to a growing interest to ensure the security
of information systems in the physical layer. In this regard, the
concept of the wiretap physical channel is introduced in [7],
including a legitimate transmitter, namely Alice, a legitimate
receiver, namely Bob, as well as an eavesdropper, namely Eve.
In this regard, the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel is de-
fined as the information capacity that can be exchanged among
Part of this work has been presented in ICC’17-WT07, the 2017 IEEE
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the legitimate users, without being accessible by Eve. The
secrecy capacity of the defined wiretap model have been since
extensively studied for various systems, regarding performance
bounds, channel coding and information theoretic aspects, as
well as the system design and resource optimization, see [8]
and the references therein.
The application of FD capability for secrecy rate maxi-
mization in a wiretap channel is studied in [9] where a FD
Bob is capable of transmitting jamming signal, considering a
single antenna Alice and a passive eavesdropper. In particular
the utilization of a FD jammer reduces the need to external
helpers, which are commonly used to degrade the reception
capability of the eavesdropper via cooperative jamming [10],
[11], without having to trust external nodes, or demanding
additional resources. The studied system [9] is then extended
to a setup where all nodes are equipped with multiple antennas
[12], [13]. Moreover, extensions on the operation the FD Bob
is introduced by considering a simultaneous information and
jamming transmission, i.e., operating as a base station [14],
and considering a FD jamming Bob that simultaneously relays
information to a third node, i.e., operating as a jamming
relay [15]. The consideration of a joint FD operation of
both Alice and Bob, i.e., a bi-directional wiretap channel, as
well as the possibility of the FD operation at Eve, i.e., an
active eavesdropper, is respectively studied in [16], [17], and
in [18], targeting at sum-secrecy rate maximization in both
communication directions.
The aforementioned works study different system possibili-
ties considering a single-carrier, frequency-flat channel model
for all of the physical links. In contrast, the consideration of
a frequency selective, multi-carrier system in the context of
sum secrecy rate maximization is extensively studied for a
wireless system with half-duplex links, see [19]–[22]. In this
respect, extension of the prior works with FD transceivers to a
frequency-selective and multi-carrier design is interesting. This
is since the usual flat-fading assumption of the previous studies
limits the usability of the proposed designs. Furthermore, in a
frequency selective setup, the frequency diversity in different
subcarriers can be opportunistically used, both regarding the
jamming and the desired information link to jointly enhance
the resulting secrecy capacity. In this respect, a power-auction
game is proposed in [23] for maximizing the sum secrecy rate
in a FD and multi-carrier system, where all nodes are equipped
with a single antenna. However, such studies are not yet
extended for a system with multiple-antenna FD transceivers.
In this paper we address a joint power and beam opti-
mization problem for sum secrecy rate maximization in a
multi-carrier and MIMO wiretap channel. We consider the
case that the receiver is capable of full-duplex (FD) opera-
tion and simultaneously sends jamming signal to a potential
eavesdropper. In particular, we simultaneously take advantage
of the spatial and frequency diversity in the system in order
to obtain a higher level of security in the physical layer. In
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Figure 1. The studied multi-carrier wiretap channel, including Alice (legit-
imate transmitter), Bob (legitimate receiver) and Eve (eavesdropper). Bob is
capable of FD operation. Upper-index n is the subcarrier index.
Section II, the system model is presented. In Section III the
corresponding optimization strategy is defined. Due to the non-
convex nature of the resulting mathematical problem, we pro-
pose an iterative solution with a guaranteed convergence, based
on block coordinate descent method [24, Subsection 2.7], by
re-structuring our problem as a separately convex program.
Moreover, for special case that the transmitter is equipped with
a single antenna, an optimal transmit power allocation strategy
is obtained analytically, assuming a known jamming strategy.
In Section IV the system is extended to a FD bidirectional
communication system. The performance of the proposed
design is then numerically evaluated in Section V.
A. Mathematical Notation:
Throughout this paper, column vectors and matrices are
denoted as lower-case and upper-case bold letters, respec-
tively. Mathematical expectation, trace, inverse, determinant,
transpose, conjugate and Hermitian transpose are denoted by
E{·}, tr(·), (·)−1 | · |, (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H , respectively. The
Kronecker product is denoted by ⊗. The identity matrix with
dimension K is denoted as IK and vec(·) operator stacks
the elements of a matrix into a vector. 0m×n represents an
all-zero matrix with size m × n. ⊥ represents the statistical
independence. diag(·) returns a diagonal matrix by putting the
off-diagonal elements to zero. The sets of real, non-negative
real, complex, natural numbers and the set of all positive semi-
definite matrices with Hermitian symmetry are respectively
denoted by R, R+, C, N and H. ‖ · ‖F represents Frobenius
norm. {a}+ is equal to a ∈ R if a ≥ 0, and zero otherwise.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a classic wiretap channel: Alice transmits a
massage to Bob while Eve intends to eavesdrop the transmitted
message. Moreover, we consider a multi-carrier and MIMO
system, where Bob is capable of FD operation by sending
a jamming signal to Eve while receiving the message from
Alice, see Fig. 1. Alice and Eve are respectively equipped
with Ma and Me transmit and receive antennas, where Bob
is equipped with Mbt (Mbr) transmit (receive) antennas. In
each subcarrier, channels are assumed to follow a quasi-
stationary and flat-fading model. In this regard, channels from
Alice to Bob (desired communication channel), Alice to Eve
(information leakage channel), Bob to Bob (SI channel), and
Bob to Eve (jamming channel) are respectively denoted as
H
(n)
ab ∈ CMbr×Ma , H(n)ae ∈ CMe×Ma , H(n)bb ∈ CMbr×Mbt and
H
(n)
be ∈ CMe×Mbt , where n ∈ N , and N is the index set of
all subcarriers. The transmit signal from Alice can be written
as
x(n) = V(n)s(n), (1)
where s(n) ∼ C (0d×1, Id) and V(n) ∈ CMa×d respectively
represent the vector of data symbols to be transmitted, and
the transmit precoder for subcarrier n. Moreover, d ∈ N
is the number of data streams which are transmitted in
parallel. On the other hand, the jamming signal transmitted
by Bob is described as w(n) ∼ CG (0Mbt×1,W(n)), where
W(n) ∈ CMbt×Mbt is the jamming transmit covariance, and
G represents Gaussian distribution. Note that the transmitted
jamming signal by Bob impacts the wiretap channel in two
opposite directions. Firstly, the jamming signal impacts the
signal received by Eve as an additional interference term,
and degrades the Alice to Eve channel. Secondly, due to the
imperfect SI cancellation, the residual interference terms lead
to the degradation of the communication channel between
Alice and Bob. Since the aforementioned effects impact the
achievable system secrecy in opposite directions, a smart
design of the jamming strategy is crucial. The received signal
by Eve is written as
y(n)e = H
(n)
ae x
(n) + H
(n)
be w
(n) + n(n)e , (2)
where n(n)e ∼ CG
(
0Me×1, N
(n)
e IMe
)
is the additive white
noise on Eve. Similarly, the received signal at Bob is formu-
lated as
y
(n)
b = H
(n)
ab x
(n) + n
(n)
b + z
(n)
b , (3)
where n(n)b ∼ CG
(
0Mbr×1, N
(n)
b IMbr
)
is the additive white
noise on Bob, and z(n)b ∈ CMbr is the baseband representation
of the residual SI signal in subcarrier n, remaining from the
SI cancellation process.
A. Residual SI model
We recognize three different sources of error considering
the state-of-the-art SI cancellation methods [25]. This includes
inaccuracy of the channel state information (CSI) regarding SI
path as well as the inaccuracy of the transmit/receive chain
elements in the analog domain. In the following we study the
impact of each part separately.
1) Linear SI cancellation error: The estimation accuracy
of the CSI in the SI path is limited, particularly in the
environments with limited channel coherence time, see [26,
Subsection 3.4.1], [27, Subsection V.C]. In this respect, the
error of the CSI estimation regarding the SI path is defined as
E
(n)
bb , such that E
(n)
bb = D
(n)
bb E¯
(n)
bb where E¯
(n)
bb is matrix of zero-
mean i.i.d. elements with unit variance, and D(n)bb incorporates
spatial correlation, see [25, Equation (8), (9)].
2) Transmitter distortion: Similar to [25], the inaccuracy
of the analog (hardware) elements in the transmit chains,
e.g., digital-to-analog converter error, power amplifier noise
and oscillator phase noise, are jointly modeled by injecting
an additive Gaussian distortion signal term for each transmit
chain. This is written as ql(t) = et,l(t)+wl(t), see Fig. 2 such
that
et,l(t) ∼ CG
(
0, κE
{
wl(t)wl(t)
∗})
,
et,l(t)⊥wl(t), et,l(t)⊥et,l(t′), et,l(t)⊥et,l′ (t), (4)
3where wl, et,l, and ql ∈ C respectively represent the intended
(distortion-free) transmit signal, additive transmit distortion,
and the actual transmit signal from the l-th transmit chain, and t
denotes the instance of time1. Moreover, we have t 6= t′ , l 6= l′ ,
and κ ∈ R+ is the distortion coefficient, relating the collective
power of the distortion signal to the intended transmit power.
3) Receiver distortion: Similar to the transmit chain, the
combined effect of the inaccurate hardware elements, e.g.,
analog-to-digital converter error, oscillator phase noise and
automatic gain control noise, are presented as an additive
distortion term q˜l(t) = er,l(t) + ul(t) such that
er,l(t) ∼ CG
(
0, βE
{
ul(t)ul(t)
∗})
,
er,l(t)⊥ul(t), er,l(t)⊥er,l(t′), er,l(t)⊥er,l′ (t), (5)
where ul, er,l, and , q˜l respectively represent the intended
(distortion-free) receive signal, additive receive distortion, and
the received signal from the l-th receive antenna. Moreover,
β ∈ R+ holds a similar role as κ regarding the distortion
signal variance in the receiver side.
Note that the defined model for transmit/receive distortion
terms follow two important intuitions. Firstly, unlike the usual
thermal noise model, the variance of the distortion terms are
proportional to the transmit/receive signal power in each chain.
Secondly, the distortion signal is statistically independent to the
intended transmit/receive signals. Such statistical independence
also holds for distortion signal terms at different chains, or
at different time instance, i.e., they follow a spatially and
temporally white statistics, see [25, Subsection II.C], and [25,
Subsection II.D]. Consequently from (5) and (4), the covari-
ance of the aggregate noise-plus-residual-interference signal on
Bob is obtained as
Σ
(n)
b = E
{(
n
(n)
b + z
(n)
b
)(
n
(n)
b + z
(n)
b
)H}
= N
(n)
b IMbr + trace
(
W(n)
)
D
(n)
bb D
(n)
bb
H
+ H
(n)
bb
(
κ(n)
∑
n∈N
diag
(
W(n)
))
H
(n)
bb
H
+ β(n)diag
(∑
n∈N
H
(n)
bb W
(n)H
(n)
bb
H
)
, (6)
where κ(n) (β(n)) represents the transmit (receive) distortion
coefficient relating the collective power of the intended trans-
mit (receive) signal to the distortion signal variance in the n-th
subcarrier2 [28].
It is worth mentioning that the impacts of the discussed
inaccuracies, i.e., et,l, er,l,E
(n)
bb , become significant for a FD
transceiver due to the strong SI channel. For instance, the
transmit distortion signals pass through the strong SI channel
H
(n)
bb and become comparable to the desired signal from
Alice which is passing through a much weaker channel H(n)ab .
Nevertheless, such inaccuracies are ignorable in the other links
which do not involve an SI path, i.e., κ  1, β  1 and∥∥∥E(n)bb ∥∥∥
F

∥∥∥H(n)bb ∥∥∥
F
.
1Note that the signal representation in time domain includes the superposi-
tion of signal parts in all subcarriers.
2The distortion coefficients associated with different subcarriers may be
different if, e.g., the subcarrier spacing is not equal over all bands, or the
power spectral density of the distortion signals are not completely flat.
Tx chain Rx chain
Figure 2. FD transceiver inaccuracy model. The impact of the limited
transmitter/receiver dynamic range is modeled as additive distortion terms.
B. Transmit power constraints
It is common to assume that the average transmit power from
each device is practically limited due to, e.g., limited battery
and energy storage. This is written as
tr
(∑
n∈N
X(n)
)
≤ Xmax, tr
(∑
n∈N
W(n)
)
≤Wmax, (7)
where
X(n) = E
{
x(n)x(n)
H
}
= V(n)V(n)
H
(8)
is the transmit covariance from Alice in the subcarrier n. More-
over, Xmax,Wmax ∈ R+ respectively represent the maximum
transmit power from Alice, and the maximum transmit power
from Bob, i.e., jamming power.
C. Sum secrecy capacity
The secrecy capacity of the defined system, for the subcarrier
n is written as
I(n)sec =
{
I(n)ab − I(n)ae
}+
=
{
log2
∣∣∣∣Id + H(n)ab X(n)H(n)ab H (Σ(n)b )−1∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣Id + H(n)ae X(n)H(n)ae H (Σ(n)e )−1∣∣∣∣
}+
,
(9)
where I(n)sec is the resulting secrecy rate in subcarrier n, and
I(n)ab , I(n)ae respectively represent the information capacity of
Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve paths. In the above formulation,
Σ
(n)
e = N
(n)
e IMe + H
(n)
be W
(n)H
(n)
be
H
is the covariance of
the received noise-plus-interference signal at Eve and Σ(n)b is
calculated from (6).
Consequently, the sum-secrecy capacity of the defined multi-
carrier system is obtained as
Isum =
∑
n∈N
I(n)sec . (10)
D. Remarks
i) Unlike the information-containing signal from Alice, the
jamming signal from Bob contains artificial noise, see [29,
Equation (5)]. This is to prevent Eve to decode the jamming
signal.
ii) We consider a case where Alice is not contributing in
the jamming process. This is to simplify the task of Alice as a
usual end-user device. The extension of the considered system
to a setup with different jamming strategies is a goal of our
future research.
iii) In this work we assume the availability of CSI on
Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve, and Bob-Eve channels. Other than sce-
narios where the position of Eve is stationary and known,
this assumption does not hold in practice. The sensitivity
of the resulting system performance to the CSI accuracy is
numerically evaluated in Section V.
4III. SUM SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this part our goal is to maximize the defined sum secrecy
rate of the system over all sub-carriers, see (10), considering
the transmit power constraints for Alice and Bob, see (7). The
corresponding optimization problem is written as
max
X,W
Isum s.t. (7) (11)
where X (W) represents the set of X(n)  0 (W(n)  0),
∀n ∈ N . By recalling (9) and known matrix identities [30,
Eq. (516)] the defined problem is reformulated as
max
X,W
∑
n∈N
{
log2
∣∣∣Σ(n)b + Θ(n)b ∣∣∣− log2 ∣∣∣Σ(n)b ∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣Σ(n)e + Θ(n)e ∣∣∣+ log2 ∣∣∣Σ(n)e ∣∣∣
}+
(12a)
s.t. tr (Θ) ≤ Xmax, tr (Σ) ≤Wmax, (12b)
where Θ :=
∑
n∈N X
(n), Θ(n)b := H
(n)
ab X
(n)H
(n)
ab
H
, and
Θ
(n)
e := H
(n)
ae X(n)H
(n)
ae
H
are affine compositions of the
Alice transmit covariance matrices X(n). Moreover, Σ =∑
n∈N W
(n), Σ(n)e , and Σ
(n)
b are affine compositions of the
transmit jamming covariance matrices X(n). Nevertheless, the
above problem is intractable, due to the {.}+ operation in
the defined secrecy value. Moreover, the maximization of
difference of such log() functions lead to a class of difference-
of-convex (DC) problems which is jointly or separately a non-
convex problem [31]. The following two lemmas transform the
objective function into a more tractable form.
Lemma III.1. At the optimality of (12), the operator {.}+ has
no impact.
Proof: The operator {.}+ impacts the problem only when
the value inside becomes negative, for at least one of the sub-
carriers n ∈ N . In such a situation, Alice and Bob can turn
off transmission in the corresponding sub-carrier, i.e., choosing
X(n) = 0,W(n) = 0, and contribute the reduced power to
another sub-carrier with a positive I(n)sec . Such action results in
the enhancement of Isum and contradicts the initial optimality
assumption.
Lemma III.2. Let R ∈ Cl×l be a positive definite matrix. The
maximization of the term −log |R| is equivalent in terms of the
optimal R and objective value to
max
R0,Q0
log |Q| − tr (QR) + l, (13)
where Q ∈ Cl×l.
Proof: Since (13) is an unconstrained concave maximiza-
tion over Q for a fixed R, the corresponding optimal R is
obtained by equalizing the derivative of the objective function
to zero. In this way we obtain Q? = R−1. This equalizes the
objective in (13) to the term −log |R| at the optimality of Q,
which concludes the proof, see also [32, Lemma 2].
Via the utilization of the defined lemmas, the problem (12)
can be restructured as
max
X,W,Q,L
∑
n∈N
(
log
∣∣∣Σ(n)b + Θ(n)b ∣∣∣+ log ∣∣∣Σ(n)e ∣∣∣ (14a)
− tr
(
Q(n)Σ
(n)
b
)
− tr
(
T(n)
(
Σ(n)e + Θ
(n)
e
))
+ log
∣∣∣Q(n)∣∣∣+ log ∣∣∣T(n)∣∣∣) (14b)
s.t. tr (Θ) ≤ Xmax, tr (Σ) ≤Wmax, (14c)
where log() is natural logarithm, Q(n) ∈ CMbr×Mbr and
T(n) ∈ CMe×Me are introduced as auxiliary variables, and the
sets Q and T are defined similar to that of X, W. Following
Lemma III.2 optimal values of the auxilliary variables are
obtained as
T(n)
?
=
(
Σ(n)e + Θ
(n)
e
)−1
, (15)
Q(n)
?
=
(
Σ
(n)
b
)−1
. (16)
Please note that the obtained problem structure (14) is not a
jointly convex problem. Nevertheless, it is a convex problem
separately over the sets X,W and Q,T. Hence, we follow
an iterative coordinate ascend update where in each iteration
the original problem is solved over a subset of the original
variable space, see [24, Subsection 2.7]. Firstly, the problem
is solved over the variable sets X,W, assuming the auxiliary
variables Q(n) and T(n) are fixed. This results in a convex
sub-problem, where the optimum point is efficiently obtained
using the MAX-DET algorithm [33]. Secondly, the problem
is solved over the auxiliary variable sets Q,T, where the
optimum solution is obtained in closed-form from (15), (16).
This procedure is repeated until a stable point is obtained, see
Algorithm 1. Please note that due to the monotonic increase
of the objective (14a) in each optimization iteration, and the
fact that the system secrecy capacity is bounded from above,
the proposed algorithm leads to a necessary convergence. The
average convergence behavior of Algorithm 1 is numerically
studied in Section V.
A. Initialization
In this section we discuss two initialization methods for the
optimization problem in (14).
1) Uniform covariance with equal power initialization: This
simple initialization method initialize the covariance matrix
of transmit signal by uniform covariance matrix with equal
power, i.e., Q ← I. In our case Q represents any matrix of
X(n),W(n),∀n ∈ N .
2) Optimal spatial beam initialization: This initialization
method aims to obtain optimal spatial beam, where the transmit
signal is orientated to the desired receiver and prevent signal
leakage to the undesired directions. This is defined as the
following maximization
max
Q∈H
tr(FQFH) + νf
tr(GQGH) + νg
, s.t. tr(Q) = 1, (17)
where Q represents the normalized covariance matrix of the
transmit signal, F and G are the desired and undesired
channels, νf , νg are the noise variances at the desired and
undesired receivers, respectively. An optimal solution to (17)
is obtained as
vec(Q?
1
2 ) = Pmax
((
I⊗GHG + νgI
)−1 (
I⊗ FHF + νfI
))
,
(18)
5where Pmax(·) calculates the dominant eigenvector. The trans-
mit power is uniform equally allocated. Please note that the
above approach is applied separately for the initialization of the
covariance matrix of information signal (X(n)) and jamming
signal (W(n)) in each subcarrier. Specifically, for the design
of X(n), we set F← H(n)ab and G← H(n)ae . For the design of
W(n) we set F← H(n)be . The choice of G for W(n) is related
to the impact of distortion terms on Bob, which reflects the
effect of the residual self-interference. The distortion power at
Bob in n-th subcarrier can be written as
tr
(
κ(n)H
(n)
bb diag
(
W(n)
)
H
(n)
bb
H
)
+ tr
(
β(n)diag
(
H
(n)
bb W
(n)H
(n)
bb
H
))
+ tr
(
tr
(
W(n)
)
D
(n)
bb D
(n)
bb
H
)
= tr
(
H˜
(n)
bb W
(n)
)
, (19)
where H˜(n)bb = κ
(n)diag
(
H
(n)
bb
H
H
(n)
bb
)
+ β(n)H
(n)
bb
H
H
(n)
bb +
tr
(
D
(n)
bb D
(n)
bb
H
)
IMbt , which consequently results in the
choice of G←
(
H˜
(n)
bb
) 1
2
.
Please note that the optimization problem does not neces-
sarily converge to the global optimum point based on any of
above two initialization methods. In Algorithm 1 we apply
the uniform covariance with equal power initialization. The
performance of two initialization methods and the optimality
gap are numerically compared and analyzed in Subsection V-A
by examining multiple random initialization.
B. Analytical computational complexity
To analyze the computational complexity of arithmetic oper-
ations we consider the floating-point operations (FLOP)s [34].
One FLOP represents a complex multiplication or a complex
summation. Then the arithmetic operations for the calculation
of Ql and Tl via (15), (16) with the inverse terms via Cholesky
decomposition in Algorithm 1 are in total
O
(
γN
(
M3e +M
3
br +MbtMe(2Mbt +Me)
+MaMe(2Ma +Me) +MbtMbr(2Mbt + 3Mbr)
))
FLOPs [34], where γ is the total required iterations number
until convergence.
More dominant computational complexity of Algorithm 1
is incurred in the steps of the determinant maximization, see
Algorithm 1, Step 7. A general form of a MAX-DET problem
is defined as
min
z
pT z + log
∣∣Y(z)−1∣∣ , s.t. Y(z) ,F(z)  0, (20)
where z ∈ Rn, and Y(z) ∈ RnY ×nY := Y0 +
∑n
i=1 ziYi and
F(z) ∈ RnF×nF := F0 +
∑n
i=1 ziFi. An upper bound to the
computational complexity of the above problem is given as
O (γ√n(n2 + n2Y )n2F ) , (21)
where γ is the total number of the required iterations until con-
vergence, see [33, Section 10]. In our problem n = N(M2a +
M2bt) representing the dimension of real valued scalar variable
space, and nY = N(Me+Mbr) and nF = N(Ma+Mbt)+2,
representing the dimension of the determinant operation and
the constraints space, respectively.
Please note that the above analysis only shows how the
bounds on computational complexity are related to different
problem dimensions. In practice the actual computational load
may vary depending on the structure simplifications and used
numerical solvers.
Algorithm 1 Iterative coordinate ascend method for sum secrecy
rate maximization
1: `← 0; set iteration number to zero
2: X0 ← IMa ; initialization: equal power in different sub-carriers
and uniform spatial beam
3: W0 ← 0Mbt ; initialization: initialize with zero jamming power
4: Q0,T0 ← 0; initialization with zero matrices
5: repeat
6: `← `+ 1;
7: X`,W` ← solve MAX-DET (14), with [33]
8: Q`,T` ← calculate (15) and (16)
9: until a stable point, or maximum number of ` reached
10: return {X`,W`,Q`,T`}
C. Optimal power allocation on Alice (Ma = 1)
In this part we study a special case where Alice is equipped
with a single antenna, and hence the problem of finding
X(n) reduces into a transmit power allocation problem among
different sub-carriers. In this regard, we focus on finding
an optimal transmit strategy from Alice assuming a known
jamming strategy. This approach is particularly interesting
where a joint design for Bob and Alice is not possible due to,
e.g., feedback delay and overhead, computation complexity.
Moreover, the obtained power allocation solution may also
serve as a basis for a low-complexity sub-optimal design for a
general case where Alice is facilitated with multiple antennas.
The resulting power allocation problem on Alice, assuming
a known jamming covariance is formulated as
max
X(n)≥0, ∀n∈N
∑
n∈N
fn
(
X(n)
)
s.t.
∑
n∈N
X(n) ≤ Xmax,
(22)
where
fn
(
X(n)
)
:= log
(
1 + α(n)X(n)
1 + β(n)X(n)
)
. (23)
In the above formulation fn
(
X(n)
)
is the realized secrecy
capacity in the sub-carrier n, α(n) := H(n)ab
H (
Σ
(n)
b
)−1
H
(n)
ab
and β(n) := H(n)ae
H (
Σ
(n)
e
)−1
H
(n)
ae , where α(n), β(n) ∈ R+.
Note that a similar power allocation approach for sum secrecy
rate maximization, in the context of HD broadcast multi-
carrier systems is studied in [21], [35]. Nevertheless, due to
the presence of FD jamming in our system, the impact of
the residual SI at Bob as well as the impact of the received
jamming signal at Eve are respectively incorporated in α(n)
and β(n). To obtain an optimal solution of (22) we consider
the Lagrangian function of the objective function in (22):
L (X, λ, τ ) =
∑
n∈N
fn(X
(n)) + λ
(
Xmax −
∑
n∈N
X(n)
)
+
∑
n∈N
τ (n)X(n), (24)
where λ and τ , which is the set of τ (n), n ∈ N , are the
Lagrange multipliers for the inequality constrains.
6It is observable from (23) that for α(n) ≤ β(n) we have
X(n)
?
= 0. On the other hand, for α(n) > β(n), the
function fn
(
X(n)
)
is a concave and increasing composition
of a concave and increasing function in X(n), and hence is
a concave function, see [31, Subsection 3.2.4]. As a result,
we obtain the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
of (22) by via the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions:
∂L (X, λ, τ )
∂X(n)
= 0 , ∀n ∈ N , (25a)
X(n) ≥ 0 , ∀n ∈ N , (25b)
Xmax −
∑
n∈N
X(n) ≥ 0 , (25c)
λ ≥ 0 , (25d)
τ (n) ≥ 0 , ∀n ∈ N , (25e)
λ
(
Xmax −
∑
n∈N
X(n)
)
= 0 , (25f)
τ (n)X(n) = 0 , ∀n ∈ N . (25g)
The following lemma reveals an important property of the
allocated power values at the optimality.
Lemma III.3. Let N0 be the set of sub-carriers with zero
allocated power at the optimality, i.e., X(n)
?
= 0,∀n ∈ N0.
Then we have
∂fn
(
X(n)
?
)
∂X(n)
= λ, ∀n ∈ N \ N0. (26)
Proof: For the sub-carrier with X(n)
?
> 0, we have
τ (n) = 0, due to (25g). Moreover, from (25a) we calculate
∂fn(X(n)
?
)
∂X(n)
−λ+τ (n) = 0. The two aforementioned arguments
conclude the proof.
The above lemma follows the interesting intuition that for
the sub-carriers with positive allocated power, the slope of the
objective function should be equal. This is expected, since if
a slope of the objective is not equal for different sub-carriers,
we can take power from the sub-carrier with smaller slope
and reallocate it to the sub-carrier with a higher slope in the
objective.
From (26) we obtain a water-filling solution structure which
can be expressed as in (28), where λ > 0 holds the concept of
water level, c.f. [21, Equation (17)]. This identity shows that
at the optimum values of X(n)
?
can be uniquely calculated for
all sub-carriers, once the value of λ? is obtained. Moreover we
have
0 ≤ λ? ≤
(
max
n
α(n) − β(n)(
1 + α(n)Xmax
) (
1 + β(n)Xmax
)) =: λmax,
(27)
which provides a feasible range for λ?. Hence, by choosing
λ as a search variable and performing a bi-section search, the
optimal power allocation solution can be obtained with a water-
filling procedure, see Algorithm 2 for the detailed procedure.
IV. SECURE BIDIRECTIONAL FULL-DUPLEX
COMMUNICATION
The proposed solution in Section III acts as an efficient
optimization framework for the underlying multi-carrier system
defined in Section II, following iterative updates using closed-
form expressions (15) and (16), as well as the MAX-DET
Algorithm 2 Water-filling optimization algorithm based on
binary search
1: h← λmax, see (27)
2: l← 0, see (27)
3: repeat
4: λ← (h+ l)/2
5: X(n) ← see (28)
6: X˜ ←∑n∈N X(n)
7: if (Xmax − X˜) < 0 then
8: l← λ
9: else
10: h← λ
11: end if
12: until 0 ≤ Xmax − X˜ < 0
13: return X(n)
algorithm. In this part we extend the same framework to
support a more general setup where both Alice and Bob are
capable of FD operation. This includes a bi-directional data
communication between Alice and Bob, as well as the jamming
capability at both nodes. The bi-directional system can improve
the performance since it leads to a higher spectral efficiency
[25], and the jamming signal from each node (Alice or Bob)
can degrade Eve’s reception quality at both directions.
In order to update our notation, we denote the number
of transmit (receive) antennas at Alice, Bob to Alice and
Alice’s SI channel in n-th sub-carrier as Mat,Mar,H
(n)
ba
and H(n)aa , respectively, see Fig. 3. Moreover, we denote
s
(n)
X ,x
(n)
X ,w
(n)
X ,V
(n)
X ,X
(n)
X ,W
(n)
X as the same signal types
as in Section II, but specific for the node X , such that
X ∈ {a, b}. Thus the transmit signal from each node is updated
as u(n)X = x
(n)
X + w
(n)
X with x
(n)
X = V
(n)
X s
(n)
X , containing both
the information and jamming signal from each node. Then
the received interference-plus-noise covariance matrix in n-th
subcarrier at Alice, Bob and Eve are updated as
Σ˜
(n)
X = N
(n)
X IMXr + H
(n)
αXW
(n)
X H
(n)
αX
H
+ trace
(
X
(n)
X + W
(n)
X
)
D
(n)
XXD
(n)
XX
H
+ H
(n)
XX
(
κ
(n)
X
∑
n∈N
diag
(
X
(n)
X + W
(n)
X
))
H
(n)
XX
H
+ β
(n)
X diag
(∑
n∈N
H
(n)
XX
(
X
(n)
X + W
(n)
X
)
H
(n)
XX
H
)
,
(29)
Σ˜(n)e = N
(n)
e IMe + H
(n)
ae W
(n)
a H
(n)
ae
H
+ H
(n)
be W
(n)
b H
(n)
be
H
,
(30)
where X ∈ {a, b}, αa = ab, αb = ba. Moreover κ(n)a (κ(n)b ) ∈
R+ and β(n)a (β(n)b ) ∈ R+ are the transmit and receive
distortion coefficient at Alice(Bob) in the n-th subcarrier, N (n)a
represents the thermal noise variance at Alice in the n-th
subcarrier. Please note that in (30) we consider a worst case
scenario where the information signal from Alice and Bob as
interference can be decoded by Eve [36]. The defined system
secrecy rate is hence written as
I˜(n)sec =
{
I˜(n)ab − I˜(n)ae
}+
+
{
I˜(n)ba − I˜(n)be
}+
, (31)
where I˜(n)ab − I˜(n)ae is obtained by applying (29) and (30) into
7X(n)
?
=
1
2
−
(
1
β(n)
+
1
α(n)
)
+
√(
1
β(n)
+
1
α(n)
)2
− 4
(
1
α(n)β(n)
− 1
λ?
(
1
β(n)
− 1
α(n)
))
+
(28)
Alice
Eve
Bob
Signal
Leakage
Jamming
SI
Figure 3. The studied bi-directional multi-carrier wiretap channel, where both
Alice and Bob are FD nodes and able to jamming Eve.
(9), and
I˜(n)ba − I˜(n)be = log2
∣∣∣∣Id + H(n)ba X(n)b H(n)ba H (Σ˜(n)a )−1∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣Id + H(n)be X(n)b H(n)be H (Σ˜(n)e )−1∣∣∣∣ , (32)
and the sum secrecy rate is defined the same as before.
A. Bidirectional sum secrecy rate maximization
Similarly to Section III, to maximize the sum secrecy rate in
bidirectional communication system the optimization problem
is written as
max
X˜,W˜
∑
n∈N
I˜(n)sec (33a)
s.t. tr
(
Θ˜a
)
≤ PA,max, (33b)
tr
(
Θ˜b
)
≤ PB,max, (33c)
where X˜ (W˜) represents the set of X(n)X  0 (W(n)X  0),
∀n ∈ N , Θ˜X :=
∑
n∈N
(
X
(n)
X + W
(n)
X
)
, X ∈ {a, b} and
PA,max, PB,max ∈ R+ represent the maximum transmit power
of Alice and Bob.
It is observed that the optimization problem in (33) holds
a similar mathematical structure in relation to the transmit
covariance matrices, i.e., X(n)X ,W
(n)
X , X ∈ {a, b}, ∀n ∈ N
as addressed for (12). Hence a similar procedure as in the
Algorithm 1 following the result of the Lemma III.1 and III.2
is employed to obtain an optimal solution. The computational
complexity of the steps of the determinant maximization
is obtained similar to (21), where n = 2N(M2at + M
2
bt),
nY = N(Me +Mar +Mbr) and nF = 2N(Mat +Mbt) + 2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we numerically evaluate the resulting sum
secrecy rate of the defined system, comparing different sys-
tem aspects and design strategies. In this respect, we as-
sume that the channels H(n)X are following an uncorre-
lated Rayleigh distribution, with variance ηX for each el-
ement, where X ∈ {ab, ba, ae, be}. Furthermore, H(n)bb ∼
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Figure 4. Average convergence behavior of the proposed iterative method.
The proposed method converges to a stable point within 10-20 optimization
iterations.
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Figure 5. Average computation time of the proposed iterative method.
CN
(√
KR
1+KR
H0,
1
1+KR
IMbr ⊗ IMbt
)
, following [37], where
H0 is a matrix with all elements equal to 1 and KR is
the Rician coefficient. The statistics of the self-interference
channel on Alice, i.e., H(n)aa , is defined similarly. The result-
ing system performance is then averaged over 200 channel
realizations. Unless otherwise is stated we use the following
values to define our default setup: Ma = Mat = Mar = 4,
Mb = Mbt = Mbr = 4, Me = 4, |N | = 4, KR = 10, Xmax =
Wmax = PA,max = PB,max = 0dB, κ = κ(n) = −30dB, β =
β(n) = −30dB, Na = N (n)a = −30dB, Nb = N (n)b = −30dB,
Ne = N
(n)
e = −30dB, ηab = ηba = ηae = ηbe = −20dB,
DˆXX = Dˆ
(n)
XX = D
(n)
XXD
(n)
XX
H
= 0MXr×MXr ,X ∈ {a, b}.
A. Algorithm analysis
In this part the average convergence behavior and the com-
putational complexity of the proposed algorithm are studied.
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Figure 6. Impact of initialization on the proposed iterative method.
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Figure 7. Obtained sum secrecy rate vs. maximum jamming power from
Bob.
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Figure 8. Obtained sum secrecy rate vs. maximum transmit power from
Alice.
Moreover the impact of the choice of initialization points are
evaluated.
In Fig. 4 the average convergence behavior of the proposed
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Figure 9. Obtained sum secrecy rate vs. transceiver dynamic range κ = β.
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Figure 10. Obtained sum secrecy rate vs. number of the transmit/receive
antennas at Bob Mb =Mbt =Mbr .
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Figure 11. Obtained sum secrecy rate vs. number of the receive antennas at
Eve.
iterative method is depicted. As it is observed, the conver-
gence is obtained within 10-20 optimization iterations, which
indicates the efficiency of the proposed iterative algorithm in
terms of the required computational effort.
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Figure 12. Performance of bidirectional secure communication related to
maximum transmit power per node.
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In Fig. 5 the average required computation time for single
directional system (‘One-direction’) and bidirectional system
(‘Bi-direction’) related to the equipped transmit/receive an-
tenna number of all nodes is depicted3. It is observed that a
higher antenna array size results in a higher required compu-
tational complexity, associated with slower convergence and
larger problem dimensions. Moreover, due to the additional
problem complexity, the bidirectional communication system
with joint FD-enabled jamming results in a higher computation
time.
In Fig. 6 the impact of the initialization method is
depicted. ‘Uniform-covariance’, ‘Optimal-spatial’, ‘Random-
max’, ‘Random-avg’ represent the uniform covariance with
equal power allocation initialization, optimal spatial beam ini-
tialization, maximal and average value of random initialization,
respectively. It is observed that under high SIC level, i.e.,
low κ, β, the uniform covariance with equal power allocation
initialization method reaches close to the benchmark perfor-
3The reported computation time is obtained using an Intel Core i7 4790S
processor with the clock rate of 3.2 GHz and 16 GB of random access memory
(RAM). The software platform is CVX [38], [39] with MATLAB 2014a on a
64-bit operating system.
mance4. Nevertheless, the optimal spatial beam initialization
method results in a worse sum secrecy rate, however, within
0.36% of the relative difference. Conversely, under low SIC
level, i.e., high κ, β, the algorithms associated with uniform
covariance with equal power allocation initialization converge
to a local optimal point with a very small iteration number,
which results in a relatively large difference margin (6-7%)
compared to the benchmark. Nevertheless, the optimal spatial
beam initialization method has a close performance compared
to the benchmark in this case.
B. Performance comparison
In this part the performance of the proposed FD-enabled
system and bidirectional communication system are evaluated
under different system conditions. The performance between
the FD-enabled setup and HD setup are also compared.
1) FD Bob jamming: In Figs. 7-11 the resulting sum secrecy
rate is depicted considering different design strategies. In
this respect, ‘Optimal-FD’ represents the proposed design in
Section III, supporting a FD jamming receiver. ‘Optimal-HD’
represents a similar setup with a HD Bob. ‘Equal-FD’ (‘Equal-
HD’) is the setup with no optimization, i.e., a uniform power
and beam allocation in all subcarriers for a system with an FD
(HD) Bob. Furthermore, ‘Equal-X, Optimal-W’, represents the
case with equal power and beam allocation over all subcarriers
for Alice together with an optimal design of the jammer.
Conversely, ‘Equal-W, Optimal-X’ represents the case with
equal power and beam allocation for Bob together with an
optimal design for Alice.
In Fig. 7 the impact of the maximum jamming power from
Bob is depicted. A considerable gain is observed in this respect
for a system with optimized jamming. Nevertheless, such gain
is limited as Wmax increases. This stems from the fact that
while jamming results in the degradation of Alice-Eve channel,
the secrecy rate is bounded due to the limited Alice-Bob chan-
nel capacity. Moreover, it is observed that such jamming gain
is only obtained by applying an optimally designed jamming
transmit strategy. This emphasizes the impact of residual SI
on the Alice-Bob communication, which should be controlled
via jamming optimization. As a result, for a system with no
jamming optimization, a high Wmax results in a significantly
lower secrecy rate due to the impact of residual SI.
In Fig. 8 the impact of the maximum transmit power
from Alice on the obtained sum secrecy rate is depicted.
Is is observed that as Xmax increases, the system obtains a
higher sum secrecy rate. The performance gain, due to the
optimization of transmit strategies, and due to the jamming
capability at Bob is observed.
In Fig. 9 the impact of the transceiver dynamic range is
depicted. It is observed that as κ(= β) increases, the jamming
gain decreases due to the impact of residual SI. In this respect,
for a transceiver with large values of κ = β the jamming
is turned-off for an optimally-designed system. On the other
hand, a high κ results in a sever degradation of the system
performance due to the impact of residual SI, if the jamming
strategy is not optimally controlled.
In Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 the obtained sum secrecy rate is
evaluated for different number of antennas at Bob and Eve.
As expected, a more powerful Eve, i.e., higher Me, results
in a reduced system secrecy. In this respect, the gain of FD
jamming becomes clear in combating the increasing quality of
4The benchmark performance is obtained by repeating the algorithm with
20 random initializations and choosing the highest obtained sum secrecy rate.
10
Alice-Eve channel. On the other hand, it is observed that the
resulting secrecy improves as Mb increases. In particular, the
gain of FD jamming becomes significant as Mb increases, as
the jamming beam can be directed to Eve more efficiently.
Furthermore, for smaller number of antennas at Bob, the
optimization at Alice gains significance. This is perceivable,
as a smaller Mb results in a smaller design freedom at Bob,
and also a weaker Alice-Bob channel.
2) Secure bidirectional communication: In Fig. 12 a bidirec-
tional secure communication system is studied. Three scenarios
are considered regarding the jamming capability. Specifically,
‘Both-FD, No-Jamming’, ‘Both-FD, Bob-Jamming’ and ‘Both-
FD, Both-Jamming’ represent the bidirectional communica-
tion system with FD operation at Alice and Bob which is
without jamming capability, with jamming capability only at
Bob and with jamming capability at both Alice and Bob,
respectively. Moreover two scenarios of the single direction
communication system are also evaluated. Specifically, ‘Both-
HD, No-Jamming’ represents the system with HD operation
at Alice and Bob without jamming capability and ‘Bob-FD,
Bob-Jamming’ represents the system with a HD Alice and a
FD Bob as a jamming receiver.
It is observed that the bidirectional communication system
leads a considerable enhancement of sum secrecy rate in a
wide range of PA,max, PB,max. Moreover, the jamming impact
is more significant with large available power. From the results
of ‘Both-FD, Both-Jamming’ and ‘Both-FD, Bob-Jamming’ it
is also observed that the bidirectional jamming leads a higher
sum secrecy rate in the studied bidirectional system, due to the
reused jamming power for both communication directions.
C. Sensitivity to CSI error
In Fig. 13 the sensitivity of the proposed design, in terms
of the resulting sum system secrecy rate, is observed with
respect to the CSI error. The CSI error is modeled as H˜(n)X =
H
(n)
X + E
(n)
X , X ∈ {ab, ae, be}, where E(n)X is modeled as
a matrix with Gaussian i.i.d. elements with variance σ2error.
It is observed that as the CSI accuracy decreases, the per-
formance of the proposed design decreases. Nevertheless, the
performance converges to its minimum level as σ2error increases,
as a high σ2error, is equivalent of having no knowledge of the
communication channels. Moreover, a system with a higher
power level is more sensitive to CSI accuracy, compared to a
system with a smaller Wmax = Xmax. This stems in the fact
that as the transmit power decreases, the significance of the
user noise increases and acts as the dominant factor in the
system. In this respect, the impact of the CSI error becomes
less significant, as noise acts as the dominant source of signal
uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied a joint power and beam
optimization problem for a multi-carrier and MIMO wiretap
channel in both single directional and bidirectional communi-
cation systems, where FD transceivers are capable of jamming.
It is observed that for a system with an adequately high SI
cancellation capability, an optimal jamming strategy results
in a significant improvement of the sum secrecy capacity.
In particular, in a frequency selective setup, the frequency
diversity in different subcarriers can be opportunistically used,
both regarding the jamming and the desired information link,
to jointly enhance the resulting secrecy capacity. Nevertheless,
it is observed that a jamming strategy with no power and/or
beam optimization may lead to a reduced system secrecy,
particularly as the SI cancellation capability decreases. More-
over, a promising sum secrecy gain is obtained from an FD
bidirectional communication, where jamming power can be
reused to improve security for both directions.
REFERENCES
[1] O. Taghizadeh, T. Yang, and R. Mathar, “Joint power and beam
optimization in a multi-carrier mimo wiretap channel with full-duplex
jammer,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications
Workshops (ICC Workshops), May 2017, pp. 1316–1322.
[2] S. Hong, J. Brand, J. I. Choi, M. Jain, J. Mehlman, S. Katti, and P. Levis,
“Applications of self-interference cancellation in 5g and beyond,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 114–121, February 2014.
[3] D. Bharadia and S. Katti, “Full duplex MIMO radios,” in 11th USENIX
Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI
14). Seattle, WA: USENIX Association, 2014, pp. 359–372.
[4] Y. Hua, P. Liang, Y. Ma, A. C. Cirik, and Q. Gao, “A method for
broadband full-duplex mimo radio,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters,
vol. 19, no. 12, pp. 793–796, Dec 2012.
[5] D. Bharadia, E. McMilin, and S. Katti, “Full duplex radios,” in Pro-
ceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 Conference on SIGCOMM, ser.
SIGCOMM ’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 375–386.
[6] A. Sabharwal, P. Schniter, D. Guo, D. W. Bliss, S. Rangarajan, and
R. Wichman, “In-band full-duplex wireless: Challenges and opportu-
nities,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 32,
no. 9, pp. 1637–1652, Sept 2014.
[7] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Labs Technical Journal,
vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[8] A. Mukherjee, S. A. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. L. Swindlehurst,
“Principles of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks:
A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 3, pp.
1550–1573, Third 2014.
[9] G. Zheng, I. Krikidis, J. Li, A. P. Petropulu, and B. Ottersten, “Improv-
ing physical layer secrecy using full-duplex jamming receivers,” IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 61, no. 20, pp. 4962–4974, Oct
2013.
[10] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, March 2010.
[11] G. Zheng, L. C. Choo, and K. K. Wong, “Optimal cooperative jamming
to enhance physical layer security using relays,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1317–1322, March 2011.
[12] L. Li, Z. Chen, D. Zhang, and J. Fang, “A full-duplex bob in the
mimo gaussian wiretap channel: Scheme and performance,” IEEE Signal
Processing Letters, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 107–111, Jan 2016.
[13] Y. Zhou, Z. Z. Xiang, Y. Zhu, and Z. Xue, “Application of full-duplex
wireless technique into secure mimo communication: Achievable se-
crecy rate based optimization,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 21,
no. 7, pp. 804–808, July 2014.
[14] F. Zhu, F. Gao, M. Yao, and H. Zou, “Joint information- and jamming-
beamforming for physical layer security with full duplex base station,”
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 62, no. 24, pp. 6391–
6401, Dec 2014.
[15] S. Parsaeefard and T. Le-Ngoc, “Full-duplex relay with jamming
protocol for improving physical-layer security,” in 2014 IEEE 25th
Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio
Communication (PIMRC), Sept 2014, pp. 129–133.
[16] S. Vishwakarma and A. Chockalingam, “Sum secrecy rate in miso full-
duplex wiretap channel with imperfect csi,” in 2015 IEEE Globecom
Workshops (GC Wkshps), Dec 2015, pp. 1–6.
[17] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, “A full-duplex active eavesdrop-
per in mimo wiretap channels: Construction and countermeasures,” in
2011 Conference Record of the Forty Fifth Asilomar Conference on
Signals, Systems and Computers (ASILOMAR), Nov 2011, pp. 265–269.
[18] M. R. Abedi, N. Mokari, H. Saeedi, and H. Yanikomeroglu, “Secure
robust resource allocation in the presence of active eavesdroppers
using full-duplex receivers,” in 2015 IEEE 82nd Vehicular Technology
Conference (VTC2015-Fall), Sept 2015, pp. 1–5.
[19] C. Jeong and I. M. Kim, “Optimal power allocation for secure multicar-
rier relay systems,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 59,
no. 11, pp. 5428–5442, Nov 2011.
11
[20] F. Renna, N. Laurenti, and H. V. Poor, “Physical-layer secrecy for ofdm
transmissions over fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1354–1367, Aug 2012.
[21] X. Wang, M. Tao, J. Mo, and Y. Xu, “Power and subcarrier allocation for
physical-layer security in ofdma-based broadband wireless networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 3,
pp. 693–702, Sept 2011.
[22] H. Qin, Y. Sun, T. H. Chang, X. Chen, C. Y. Chi, M. Zhao, and
J. Wang, “Power allocation and time-domain artificial noise design
for wiretap ofdm with discrete inputs,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 2717–2729, June 2013.
[23] M. Li, Y. Guo, K. Huang, and F. Guo, “Secure power and subcarrier auc-
tion in uplink full-duplex cellular networks,” China Communications,
vol. 12, no. Supplement, pp. 157–165, December 2015.
[24] D. P. Bertsekas, Nonlinear programming. Athena scientific Belmont,
1999.
[25] B. P. Day, A. R. Margetts, D. W. Bliss, and P. Schniter, “Full-duplex
bidirectional mimo: Achievable rates under limited dynamic range,”
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 60, no. 7, pp. 3702–3713,
July 2012.
[26] M. Jain, J. I. Choi, T. Kim, D. Bharadia, S. Seth, K. Srinivasan, P. Levis,
S. Katti, and P. Sinha, “Practical, real-time, full duplex wireless,” in
Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Conference on Mobile
Computing and Networking, ser. MobiCom ’11. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2011, pp. 301–312.
[27] V. Aggarwal, M. Duarte, A. Sabharwal, and N. K. Shankaranarayanan,
“Full- or half-duplex? a capacity analysis with bounded radio resources,”
in 2012 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Sept 2012, pp. 207–211.
[28] O. Taghizadeh, V. Radhakrishnan, A. C. Cirik, R. Mathar, and L. Lampe,
“Linear transceiver design for bidirectional full-duplex mimo ofdm
systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.04815, 2017.
[29] Y. Sun, D. W. K. Ng, J. Zhu, and R. Schober, “Multi-objective
optimization for robust power efficient and secure full-duplex wireless
communication systems,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communica-
tions, vol. 15, no. 8, pp. 5511–5526, Aug 2016.
[30] K. B. Petersen and M. S. Pedersen, “The matrix cookbook,” nov 2012,
version 20121115.
[31] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. New York, NY,
USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[32] J. Jose, N. Prasad, M. Khojastepour, and S. Rangarajan, “On robust
weighted-sum rate maximization in mimo interference networks,” in
2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), June
2011, pp. 1–6.
[33] L. Vandenberghe, S. Boyd, and S.-P. Wu, “Determinant maximization
with linear matrix inequality constraints,” SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl.,
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 499–533, Apr. 1998.
[34] R. Hunger, Floating point operations in matrix-vector calculus. Munich
University of Technology, Inst. for Circuit Theory and Signal Processing
Munich, 2005.
[35] E. A. Jorswieck and A. Wolf, “Resource allocation for the wire-tap
multi-carrier broadcast channel,” in 2008 International Conference on
Telecommunications, June 2008, pp. 1–6.
[36] D. W. K. Ng, E. S. Lo, and R. Schober, “Robust beamforming for
secure communication in systems with wireless information and power
transfer,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 13,
no. 8, pp. 4599–4615, Aug 2014.
[37] M. Duarte, C. Dick, and A. Sabharwal, “Experiment-driven characteri-
zation of full-duplex wireless systems,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 11, no. 12, pp. 4296–4307, December 2012.
[38] M. Grant and S. Boyd, “CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex
programming, version 2.1,” Mar. 2014.
[39] ——, “Graph implementations for nonsmooth convex programs,” in
Recent Advances in Learning and Control, ser. Lecture Notes in Control
and Information Sciences, V. Blondel, S. Boyd, and H. Kimura, Eds.
Springer-Verlag Limited, 2008, pp. 95–110.
